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ABSTRACT 
Economists concerned with validity, defined internally to the profession, are 
combining stated preference methods with participatory deliberation to address on-
going criticism.  DMV uses formal methods of deliberation to express values for 
environmental change in monetary terms.  However, the results have begun to 
define different realms of value, reflecting pluralism in public concern over 
environmental change.  Reviewing empirical DMV studies evidences a range of 
issues regarded as external to economics and the validity of its methods, issues 
which are typically kept at arms length by economists namely, multiple values, 
incommensurability and lexicographic preferences, social justice, fairness, and non-
human values. 
 
(JEL D46, Q00, Q51) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) has become an increasingly popular area of 
research in recent years.  This aims to combine stated preference methods with 
elements of deliberative processes from political science (Spash, 2001).  Thus a 
merge is intended between large scale monetary survey techniques and small scale 
group deliberation. 
The reasons for pursuing this approach seem clear enough to some CBA 
practitioners, and especially those working with stated preference methods.  Not only 
have such things as focus groups become a common supplementary form of 
information (Brouwer et al., 1999; Chilton and Hutchinson, 1999), but stakeholders 
are (if the truth be known) also informally introduced into the social process which is 
monetary evaluation and assessment (see examples in Niemeyer and Spash, 2001).  
Formalising inclusions of deliberation has also been seen as a method of addressing 
the combined issues of preference construction and lack of knowledge (e.g., 
Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006).  Deliberative sessions are then hoped to increase 
the validity of the resulting numbers by addressing criticisms that people do not have 
prior preferences over most complex environmental problems, and may often have 
extremely poor understanding of the issues.  This seems reasonable given that even 
the more highly educated in the population appear to find concepts such as 
biodiversity hard to explain (Spash and Hanley, 1995).  If deliberative processes can 
achieve preference formation in the political context then why not in an economic 
one? 
There might also be other advantages.  Participatory planning and policy 
analysis have received increasing attention as tools of governance due to three 
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types of benefits: (i) the substantive, improvement of the knowledge base, (ii) the 
instrumental, increased likelihood of stakeholder compliance and support, and (iii) 
the normative, strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of public policies (Pelletier 
et al., 1999).  Participation and deliberation leading to monetary valuation is then 
hoped to increase “buy-in” to the outcome, so encouraging formalisation of the 
structure of inclusion.  However, the results may not be those desired by economists 
(or others following monism) as structured approaches to stakeholder participation 
show multiple, complimentary, value systems are expressed via discursive 
engagement (Kontogianni et al., 2001). 
Indeed the conception of a social process of valuation under the heading 
participation seems somewhat at odds with the role being advocated for 
environmental monetary valuation as part of CBA and ecosystems valuation.  In the 
latter contexts the utilitarian calculations and technical analysis are the process, so 
the role political scientist have described for public deliberation seems to strongly 
diverge from the economic requirement.  Indeed this was the type of conclusion 
reached as part of the European project named VALSE (O'Connor et al., 1998; 
O'Connor, 2000; Aguilera-Klink and Sanchez-Garcia, 2002) which raised many 
issues about how we should proceed in better understanding environmental values.  
One part of that project was the exploration of citizens’ juries (Aldred and Jacobs, 
1997; 2000) and the simultaneous evaluation of the same environmental change 
using the contingent valuation method (CVM) (Spash, 1998; 2000), in order to 
provide cross comparison (O'Neill and Spash, 1998; O'Neill and Spash, 2000).  The 
original aim had been to test how group deliberation affected individual willingness to 
pay (WTP), but the two approaches were in the end treated separately because the 
open outcomes of the citizen’s jury were felt to be so far removed from the closed 
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expert framing of the CVM.  The potential for combining approaches in a DMV 
process, where participatory approaches are used to produce a shadow price as the 
outcome, appeared at best limited if not internally contradictory, with value outcomes 
hard to frame or interpret in any meaningful sense (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; 
Spash, 2001; Aldred, 2005).2
This conclusion now seems premature, or at least in need of further 
clarification, because of the continued interest in DMV.  Driven by the continued 
need to improve the validity of stated preference approaches, in the light of 
persistent criticism, a growing number of economic researchers have actually 
combined aspects of political deliberation and social learning in order to produce a 
monetary value.  The latest literature in this area can be split into the largely 
descriptive case study applications which generally contain limited reflection upon 
theory (Gregory and Wellman, 2001; Macmillan et al., 2002; James and Blamey, 
2005; Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006; Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006; 
Shapansky, Adamowicz and Boxall, 2006; Urama and Hodge, 2006; Lienhoop and 
MacMillan, 2007a; Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007b), and the specifically theoretical 
and methodological analyses (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; Spash, 2001; Wilson and 
Howarth, 2002; Aldred, 2005; Howarth and Wilson, 2006).  This adds to an earlier 
theoretical literature related to DMV (e.g., studies cited in footnote 1 plus Brown, 
Peterson and Tonn, 1995; Sagoff, 1998; Ward, 1999).  Empirical studies are 
unintentionally raising issues about the meaning of social and communal values.  In 
light of this recent work, I reappraise the potential for combining small group 
                                                 
2
 During the 1990s, the idea of deliberation in a monetary valuation setting was discussed by 
researchers in Australia (Blamey, 1994; Blamey, 1996; Blamey and James, 1999; Blamey et al., 
2000), and in a series workshops at Lancaster University, UK.  The latter led to an edited volume of 
which the chapter by Jacobs (1997) is usually cited in the DMV context, but also of note from this 
period is Holland (1997).  Some cross fertilisation and exchange between various of the Australian 
and UK researchers also took place throughout the 1990s. 
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deliberation with stated preference techniques in order to obtain environmental 
values and investigate what has actually been coming out of these studies.  I then 
draw out some key aspects of DMV and discuss whether economists are actually 
validating stated preference methods or unintentionally providing empirical evidence 
for a new theory of value. 
THEORETICAL ADVOCATES OF DMV 
The standard theoretical suggestion for a DMV is a jury type process either legally 
constituted (Brown, Peterson and Tonn, 1995) or based upon a political model 
(Sagoff, 1998; Ward, 1999).  The latter links directly to the literature on citizens’ 
juries as a formal process with a supporting literature in political science (e.g., 
Crosby, 1995).  The citizens’ jury approach is described as having several 
advantages, which could be transferred to a DMV process, including: open access to 
information, calling and questioning of witnesses, potential to address non-human 
interests and other silent voices such as those of future generations, direct debate 
over distribution, fairness and equity issues.  Wilson and Howarth (2002: 435) 
directly link DMV with Rawls and Habermas and define social fairness as “a 
deliberative forum that: (a) protects participants from uncompensated harms; and (b) 
ensures that participants have a common set of rights or capabilities.”. 
DMV is seen as a social process of valuation because it engages individuals 
as representative of social groups (Spash, 2007).  Standard economic approaches 
rely upon statistical representation and random selection, although in practice quota 
and convenience samples are more common.  Small group deliberation often 
explicitly engages in representing vested interests or stakeholders.  This diverges 
from getting a socially representative group of citizens to take a long-term, informed 
and impartial view.  Ward (1999: 76) argues that the “opinions and perceived 
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interests” of the population should be represented and not agency.  Indeed he sees 
social representation as involving the avoidance of “the pattern in everyday politics 
whereby well-organised and resourced groups get a disproportionate say” (Ward, 
1999: 83).  Brown, Peterson and Tonn (1995) also wish to avoid undue influence by 
vested interests and recommend a de jure jury selection process to achieve 
deliberation as to the common good. 
The general aim of the DMV process is for a group consensus over the 
aggregate social value of an environmental change and in the absence of consensus 
majority voting is noted as acceptable (Brown, Peterson and Tonn, 1995; Ward, 
1999; Wilson and Howarth, 2002; Howarth and Wilson, 2006).  Only Sagoff (1998) 
diverges from this aim in that he proposes three alternative forms of outcome: (i) a 
social WTP expressed as an individual opinion, (ii) a group decision as to the “value 
or price” which is paid by individuals, (iii) an individual WTP framed as a fair share, 
which might best be described as a charitable contribution.  Unfortunately the 
interrelationship and role of these three different measures is left very unclear, 
especially with regard to how they might relate to existing value theory in economics 
and numbers used in CBA, and indeed there is some hint that they might be 
incommensurable (Sagoff, 1998: 226).  For other advocates of DMV the aim appears 
to be to avoid aggregation issues by aiming for an already aggregated social 
WTP/WTA outcome (only achieved by Sagoff’s first option). 
Seeking consensus, as part of DMV, is a debateable goal.  For example, this 
seems rather at odds with the claim that “ultimate success depends not on unanimity 
or collective action among all citizens, but on the formalization of procedures and 
conditions for achieving free and fair deliberation between them.” (Wilson and 
Howarth, 2002: 435).  As Holland (1999: 286) explains: “Conflict and distrust, it may 
5 
Deliberative Monetary Valuation (DMV) in Practice 
 
be argued, are in fact vital for a healthy democracy.  It is true that there have to be 
ways of taking decisions.  But it is not obvious that this requires there to be 
consensus over values.  Indeed, the notion of a consensus over values is arguably 
an oxymoron.  Values are nothing if they do not involve commitment.  And 
commitments are nothing if they are given up in contexts of ‘facilitation’.”  Ward 
(1999: 84) expresses the same concern noting that a drive for consensus can be 
coercive and that failure to achieve consensus can be a socially important fact.  In an 
idealised democratic setting the interplay of pluralistic values in a social setting takes 
place via open deliberation, between individuals and social groups, without coercion. 
Accepting that different participants will have different conceptions of what 
constitutes “good” means that focussing the process on a money metric may also 
prove problematic.  Ward (1999) sees deliberation explicitly addressing concerns 
over distributional weighting and discounting in order to produce the social value.  
Thus, open DMV discussion is recognised as unlikely to focus solely on economic 
efficiency and instead would be expected to introduce a range of concerns, such as 
those over fair distribution (Howarth and Wilson, 2006).  This means allowing for 
alternative values to be expressed, not aiming for a simple single figure, and 
including reports on a variety of mitigating facts and problems.  Indeed exposing 
value conflicts and different basis for moral choice is seen as a positive advantage of 
the approach.  As Ward (1999: 84) states: “Conventional methods of contingent 
evaluation actually hide such differences by implicitly assuming all individuals buy 
into a quasi-utilitarian ethic.  Where this is not the case, it is important that this is 
recognised.” He goes on to note that a DMV approach might also offer alternatives to 
monetary measures and consider whether the policy framing is right in a 
deontological sense.  This potential pluralism is also recognised in identifying DMV 
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as providing an interactive setting which can mimic some of the social processes in 
which we value the environment.  In contrast, stated preference methods are noted 
to involve little or no meaningful social interaction (Ward, 1999: 87). 
Interaction with others and new information are expected to change 
individuals’ judgments about their interests and actions.  Recognising that 
manipulation is a present and on-going state of affairs in modern society implies a 
need for processes which remove such distortion allowing people to break free and 
apply some corrective reflection (Niemeyer, 2005: 348).  To this end some facilitation 
is noted as necessary in-line with accepted citizens’ jury practice.  For example, 
preventing articulate, well-educated people from dominating proceedings (Ward, 
1999: 80), while encouraging the less articulate to address the “willingness to say” 
problem.  However, this does not extend to closing down areas of debate or 
excluding non-economic values.  The expectation from political theory is that 
deliberation will allow individuals to look beyond immediate self-interest and toward 
the common good (Niemeyer, 2004). 
This has also been extended to a moralising effect which can enfranchise 
Nature and allow representation of others (including non-humans).  Representation 
of silent voices such as those of non-humans and future generations remains a 
problematic issue in all processes of environmental valuation, due to the lack of 
authorisation, accountability and presence (O'Neill, 2001).  Reliance may therefore 
be placed upon legitimacy to speak for silent voices due to the knowledge, expertise 
or judgment of the representative and their reflection of this in caring for the interests 
and aspirations of the silent ones (O'Neill, 2001).  This could be achieved by calling 
witnesses rather than relying entirely on emergent properties. 
7 
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There seems some clear agreement amongst those advocating DMV that it 
should be a social process involving formal elements of political processes.  This is 
most commonly referred to as the citizens’ jury format, but the more general point is 
small group deliberation for the common good.  While advocates highlight the 
importance of the monetary outcome they also tend to raise issues of pluralism, 
openness, fairness and free debate. 
A REVIEW OF DMV STUDIES IN PRACTICE 
The preceding section has outlined how DMV is described in theory.  This shows 
that there are four approaches to DMV which have been put forward.  Table 1, 
following Spash (2007), shows how the propositions can be split by the objective 
being either an individual or social value, and the means of articulating that value 
being based upon group or individual choice.  Including those proposing each 
approach clearly shows the theoretical bias towards a social WTP/WTA value 
derived by group arbitration.  In this section I critically review the empirical studies as 
they match the quadrants of Table 1. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Individual WTP & WTA in a Social Context 
In contrast to seeking a general social WTP there have been a series of studies 
which have used the group process for some discussion and possibly social learning 
and then reverted to an individual payment (Macmillan et al., 2002; Kenyon and 
Hanley, 2005; Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006; Shapansky, Adamowicz and 
Boxall, 2006; Urama and Hodge, 2006; Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007a; Lienhoop 
and MacMillan, 2007b).  This can be regarded as individual decision-making in a 
group context.  The outcome is meant to be an individual exchange value equivalent 
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to having undergone a process of arbitrage.  However, the processes used and 
results seem highly variable and, as will be demonstrated, the values arising appear 
best classified as charitable contributions. 
Macmillan et al. (2002) aim to produce an individual WTP for goose 
conservation in Scotland which has improved validity due to allowing more time for 
discussion and reflection.  They conceptualise the valuation process as one where 
individuals “research their underlying preferences, form and then state a WTP value” 
(Macmillan et al., 2002: 50).  The DMV sessions consist of two one hour meetings 
separated by one week, during which free thought on the environmental trade-off is 
supposed to be noted in diaries.3  What happened at the second meeting is very 
unclear as some people are noted not to have returned but also WTP bids are 
mentioned to have been obtained by phone and in the post? 
The approach is mentioned as combining citizens’ juries with the CVM, but 
seems to have little formal connection to the jury method.  The DMV in this case is 
more akin to a test re-test experiment on a CVM.  The sample is selected on the 
same basis as for a CVM survey and a payment card is used, which obviously 
bounds the decision.  A comparison with a standard CVM approach is argued to 
show a largely inexplicable decrease in WTP due to the week gap.  While the 
conclusions make passing reference to the importance of moderators and the need 
for managing the group process.  There is no description of any process or 
procedures of conduct for debate. 
                                                 
3
 Largely the benefits of the approach seem to be that individuals could go away and follow their own 
informal procedures, or none at all.  There is some reference to family discussion and people going 
to libraries being important without scientific data or evidence (eg. the number of people this 
affected, how, to what extent). 
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There are two aspects of this study which are of interest.  First, the bid curve 
analysis shows that WTP under the standard CVM (adjusted R2 0.17) only relates to 
one variable which is a general attitude to wildlife protection.  There are no standard 
socio-economic variables such as education, gender or income.  The WTP result 
after a week (adjusted R2 0.36) has three other variables of which one is a more 
specific attitudinal variable relating to geese, one a dummy on environmental group 
membership, and the third household size (the most significant variable by far).  This 
suggests the result is strongly related to attitudes which may be ameliorate by an 
implicit variable (e.g. budget, number of children?) reflected in household size. 
The second point of interest has more to do with the expectations of the 
researchers than the DMV itself.  The authors are positively concerned to remove 
any bids based upon fairness, describing this as strategic behaviour.  As they state: 
“participants may use additional time and information to calculate a ‘fair’ donation 
rather than their maximum WTP”, and “appropriate checks and protocols to minimise 
the risk of it occurring are essential” (Macmillan et al., 2002: 57).  Indeed there is a 
role here for the moderator “to be proactive and encourage the discussion along 
appropriate lines, for example by countering any tendencies toward ‘strategising’ but 
without unduly influencing the WTP of participants for the project” (Macmillan et al., 
2002: 57).  Of course within the context of the neoclassical model and welfare 
economics the authors are correct, they want a trade-price not an attitude or a 
charitable contribution, but this seems to conflict with placing individuals in a group 
setting. 
Kenyon and Hanley (2005) are concerned with the empirical application and 
comparison of citizens juries, CVM and DMV to the Ettrick Forest Floodplain 
Restoration Project in Scotland.  The arguments are firmly based within an economic 
10 
C.L. Spash 
process model with, for example, citizens’ juries described as addressing “the 
information problem better than the CVM”.  That is their concern is with addressing 
the fact that preferences are formed and not merely informed during a valuation 
process and any information set is never ‘neutral’ (see Spash, 2002).  The reason 
Kenyon and Hanley (2005: 211) give for pursuing DMV is because citizens’ juries “do 
not provide an economic estimate of the value of any particular project, nor whether 
it constitutes an efficient use of resources”.  For the CVM a stratified sample of nine 
towns results in 336 responses to the survey including the request for a charitable 
donation.  Of these 29 per cent are classified as protest bids and removed from the 
data set and any further analysis.  For the citizens jury participants were a sub-
sample of the CVM respondents.  Kenyon and Hanley (2005: 214) claim that the 
eleven jurors were selected “to be representative of the Borders population”, 
although how so is unspecified.  The jury considered environmental and social 
elements in judging the success of the project and in making management 
recommendations, but “they did not seem to consider economic criteria important”. 
Selection for the DMV is on the basis of responses to a letter sent to 500 
households.  Two workshops were carried out in each of two towns in the Borders, 
giving a total of four workshops and 44 participants.  The DMV starts by 
administering the CVM, then takes participants into small group (5-7 people) 
discussion on problems and management options, and finally asks them as 
individuals to answer some questions including whether they now want to revise their 
WTP (14 percent do so).  Initial DMV bids include 5 percent protests and 34 percent 
‘don’t know’ responses, and only two people are found to move from the latter after 
the discussion stage.  An advantage of the DMV over the CVM is seen to be 
information gained on positive and negative views of the project.  When an 
11 
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aggregated WTP figure is presented back to the DMV participants there are three 
responses: the impossibility of putting a value on such a project, the poor economic 
situation meaning the need to spend money elsewhere, and wanting some other 
public fund to pay.  Overall the authors conclude in favour of DMV as a middle path, 
although given these public responses a question remains as to the advantages for 
validating economic valuation and stated preference methods. 
Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop (2006) conduct two CVM surveys for 
comparison with a DMV in a rather complex design.  The first CVM delivers a WTP 
survey by mail and then later re-tests by phone (2 WTP results), the second does the 
same but adds more information and a second mail survey before the phone survey 
(3 WTP results).  The DMV approach consists of two small group meetings each 
involving individual in-person survey responses, and then a final phone survey (3 
WTP results).  So in all 8 WTP amounts are obtained across 3 sub-samples.  The 
process is run for two goods in separate samples (giving 16 WTP results): green 
electricity (wind power) and increasing the numbers of a rare bird (red kyte) in the 
wild.  Design is further complicated by including negative information prior to the last 
phone survey, and WTP and WTA on the same payment card. 
A sample of 165 is reported for each good, which drops over the re-tests to 
133 and 128 for bird species and wind power respectively.  Selection is described in 
rather lose terms as being from the largest regional employer in Aberdeen (ie. the 
University?) and on grounds of “economic status” which is elaborated with four 
variables but then states a fifth “etc” (Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 300).  
Each sample for each CVM and the DMV approach are then stated to be “similar 
with respect to these characteristics” (Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 300), 
although why this is required and why for these characteristics is not clarified.  
12 
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Indeed when finding WTP varied significantly between the two initial CVM mail 
samples the authors “cannot explain this result” (Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 
2006: 303). 
The study is really too ambitious and suffers from too much uncontrolled 
variation across the sub-samples which are also too small for standard statistical 
analysis.  Uncontrolled variation enters because of group drop-out affecting the 
socio-economic representation stated as needed.  The DMV group dynamic can be 
expected to have changed as there were 8 groups among 60 people to start and 
only 49 and 50 people for each good at the end.  Presumably there was variation in 
drop-out making some groups very small?  The time between WTP responses was 
uncontrolled for the two CVM samples as it relied upon mail surveys, and in the first 
case there was no middle survey so the re-test period varied by design.  In the DMV 
information was taken home so there is no idea of intervening factors, which is 
recognised in part by a follow-up “telephone de-briefing exercise” to gather more 
information (Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 305).  The issue of protesting is 
mentioned only briefly as being low, the same for all approaches and goods and 
relating primarily to bid vehicles (although these were different for the two goods?).  
Protestors are then aggregated into a “non-completion” category, who “were 
identified and excluded” (Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 303). 
Although touching on issues of preference formation the authors focus on 
preferences as needing to be better informed and therefore try to design variations in 
information into the applications to test for impacts on WTP.  Respondents are 
regarded as needing time to “fully research their preferences” (Macmillan, Hanley 
and Lienhoop, 2006: 299) rather than construct them.  The DMV approach allows 
13 
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“information and discussion” which is “moderated”.4  This is stated to “generate more 
valid estimates of WTP” (Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 300).  Yet there 
seems little sign of impact on WTP as they state for both goods under DMV there is 
a strong correlation between initial and final WTP.  The main activity for the group 
meetings is the “opportunity to ask further questions and to discuss any unresolved 
issues concerning the project”.  The main conclusion seems to be that “discussion 
and deliberation tends to stimulate demand for information and knowledge” 
(Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 305). 
In analysing the 16 WTP results using regression models only 2 proved 
significant.  Poor statistical results do not prevent the authors claiming more 
information increases preference uncertainty and reduces “validity of WTP 
responses”, although two paragraphs later they do note that “overall the evidence 
relating to the role of information is ambiguous” (Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 
2006: 306).  Despite all this DMV is recommended for “less familiar goods” as a 
process where “benefit estimates should be generated using deliberative methods 
that allow participants to think and consider, gather and understand relevant 
information, and to discuss all facets of the valuation exercise in moderated groups” 
(Macmillan, Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 306). 
Shapansky et al. (2006) employ a choice experiment approach with three 
levels of engagement in WTP for forestry related benefits.  Their aim is to test for the 
influence of preference construction.  Participant selection is not detailed beyond 
noting they are all locals in a forest extraction community.  Group 1 (N=11) was 
involved in choice experiment design and discussion and met three times at monthly 
intervals.  Group 2 (N=13) met once and asked questions answered on the spot.  
                                                 
4
 The group deliberations are stated to be “moderated by experienced CV moderators” (Macmillan, 
Hanley and Lienhoop, 2006: 301-302), which is strange as CVM is usually not moderated at all? 
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Group 3 (N=19) never met but was a mail survey of the standard choice experiment 
questions.  All three groups give a WTP as individuals based upon the survey 
designed by Group 1.  The authors are surprised that Group 1, with the most 
engagement with researchers, proves to have WTP magnitude and stability which is 
similar to Group 3.  Group 2 is different and less stable.  The authors mention but do 
not report upon attitude and belief measurements which along with other factors fail 
to explain the differences observed.  They conclude that “unobserved heterogeneity 
was generating the differences in preferences” (Shapansky, Adamowicz and Boxall, 
2006: 15).  The approach to preference construction is noted as being unclear and 
the authors question whether their study took the correct approach.  Alternative 
explanations offered are that the design by Group 1 was so successful that it 
obviated any need for preference construction by Group 3, alternatively selection 
bias is the problem in that those involved being engaged locals may have had well-
formed preferences already.  Neither explains the Group 2 result. 
Urama and Hodge (2006) conduct an exercise which has aspects of a DMV 
although very close to a normal CVM, and shows how deliberative rhetoric is being 
employed in valuation.  A normal CVM survey is administered and then six months 
later the same 108 people are surveyed again after completing five one hour 
“education sessions” over five days.  The aim is to “enable individuals to form 
coherent and consistent values” by providing them with “adequate information” 
(Urama and Hodge, 2006: 543).  Participatory events are stated to be used as a 
“social learning tool”.  Although they recognise something of the deliberative ideal in 
noting that “participation develops individuals’ attitudes and values” through sharing 
of “knowledge, beliefs and attitudes” (Urama and Hodge, 2006: 546).  The 
participation sessions are tightly focussed upon a set of consequential relationships 
15 
Deliberative Monetary Valuation (DMV) in Practice 
 
connecting irrigation schemes with soil fertility decline, water pollution, health risks, 
and biodiversity loss.  Hour long sessions on each of these aspects conclude with 
one summarising all the impacts.  Having basically reinforced the reasons for 
needing to take action for five consecutive days the authors note, with some 
satisfaction, that participant assessment of the severity of impacts increased along 
with WTP, although the more highly educated seem less easy to persuade.  This is 
of course quite removed from free association in a deliberative forum without 
coercion, which is presumably why the authors refer to the process as “education”. 
The best regression model explains 29% of variation in WTP, improved from 
21%, so the authors have managed to get people more focussed on their 6 variable 
model.  However, this does little to convince that the WTP values are economically 
driven and not charitable donations to the trust fund bid vehicle based upon non-
economic motives.  The authors note that typical trade prices in Nigeria are 
negotiated so they use an iterative biding game but in a footnote they also note that 
67% and 44% of the first and second CVM samples respectively give only one bid ie. 
do not negotiate. 
Refusals to trade also arise.  Originally 10% express ethical concerns stated 
to reflect lexicographic preferences.  The “education” process manages to convince 
most of these respondents to revise their preferences “in the light of improved 
understanding obtained during the participatory workshops” (Urama and Hodge, 
2006: 552).  There is then a logical leap to concluding that the original positions are 
“based on poor cognitive understanding of the tradeoffs involved” (Urama and 
Hodge, 2006: 558) and therefore somehow illegitimate, weak and need removing. 
Lienhoop and MacMillan (2007a; 2007b) present a case study using CVM and 
DMV in Iceland to look at dam construction in a wilderness area.  As in Macmillan, 
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Hanley and Lienhoop (2006) a payment card with both WTP and WTA is employed 
but here is followed by an open-ended question.  In Lienhoop and MacMillan (2007b) 
considerable attention is focussed upon the fact that WTA is a credible alternative to 
WTP and indeed the correct welfare measure (as Knetsch has been at pains to 
explain for some time 1994; 2005).  These articles also give more careful 
explanation of the approach.  Participants are paid (20-25 euros) for the group 
meeting.  There are 7-12 participants in each group.  The moderator directs the main 
discussion at provision of the environmental change.  The authors note that “The 
informal and relaxed relationship between the moderator and participants also 
seemed to create trust” (Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007b: 294).  Participants are 
given information to take home with the directive to read and discuss with others.  A 
week later they are phoned and asked to bid again.  The aim is to obtain from DMV 
“thoughtful and informed economic trade-offs” to improve CVM “validity and 
accuracy”. 
The amount of information and time are stated to have been kept constant, to 
test for discussion effects, but how so is unclear because the DMV is noted as 
having a variable time 1-1.5 hours, and CVM surveys in the field cannot be 
controlled for time.  Also this implies the participants bring no information to the 
process, which rather conflicts with the concept of deliberative fora.  Indeed the 
possibility is mentioned of DMV explicitly investigating issues relating to future 
generations and wealth distribution, which alludes to the political ideal of emerging 
group information and values leading to transformative experiences in deliberation 
(e.g., preference construction). 
The role of the moderator is given a little more insight in Lienhoop and 
MacMillan (2007a).  The presence of dominant participants is seen as a problem 
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which they are there to control.  The moderator should prevent “biased attitudes and 
hence biased WTP or WTA”.  Indeed “an experienced moderator should be able to 
eliminate such effects by discrediting incorrect arguments”.  Although, the authors 
note some of these influences “cannot be controlled”.  Thus, a key role of the 
moderator seems to be to control the information coming from group members and 
to make them conform to an unspecified behavioural model. 
The DMV had 53 participants selected by a variety of methods, the CVM was 
a very small (N=62) convenience sample from airport lounges and public parks.  
Once sub-samples are split out the regression analysis can only be run on WTA 
under the CVM and the model proves insignificant, but this does not prevent the 
authors drawing inferences (Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007a).  In Lienhoop and 
MacMillan (2007a) the process of DMV is claimed to be superior to CVM due to 
better participant engagement.  Motivation is monitored on the basis of incidents of 
disengagement (e.g. answering a mobile phone call), and basically DMV participants 
are found to be more engaged.  This is explained as due to the attendance payment, 
and the moderator creating trust and reinforcing the importance of participants views 
(Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007a). 
An interesting aspect of the work is the occurrence of “infinite values”, in the 
DMV sample, to which five people switched from a WTA, one from being unsure, 
after the week break (note exact sub-sample size is unclear but this appears to be 
20-25% of the WTA group).  This rather confounds the standard explanations 
mentioned such as lack of time to think.  Indeed the authors note that the DMV 
approach used should have enabled people to “tackle the trade-off” but instead “the 
number of participants with lexicographic motives increased” (Lienhoop and 
MacMillan, 2007b: 294).  This is rather left hanging in the air because the authors 
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prior belief is that protest responses are those failing to reflect “genuine valuations” 
(Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007a).  Thus, the authors’ conception of true WTP/WTA 
based upon the divergence of stated from revealed WTP/WTA fails to aid in 
understanding motives and non-economic values. 
From Individual to Group Estimates of Individual WTP 
The preceding studies all aimed to validate a standard individual WTP or WTA by 
putting respondents through some form of group process.  An alternative is to put 
respondents through this process but rather than ask for a response as individuals to 
ask for the group to make a decision as to what an individual should pay or accept.  
Depending upon the exact group process this might be regarded as resulting in a 
decision as to the fair price which should be set.  Only one study was found to have 
attempted this approach. 
Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley (2006) build closely upon the study by Macmillan 
et al (2002) of which they were co-authors but go beyond this by producing a group 
valuation rather than stopping at an individual valuation.  The DMV approach here is 
more carefully detailed and the extended group sessions appear more closely 
modelled upon a discursive political model, which again is claimed to be a citizens’ 
jury.  The value elicitation procedure is not a CVM approach but rather similar to that 
of Gregory (2001) or Shapansky, Adamowicz and Boxall (2006), ie. a choice 
modelling variant.5  A main stated preference survey is conducted first and then two 
groups of twelve are selected for the DMV exercise.  So this sub-sample already has 
prior experience of the valuation exercise before even the first information session. 
                                                 
5
 In such approaches objects are not valued directly or explicitly but rather implicitly via the inclusion 
of a cost amongst several attributes shown together.  Individuals then choose repeatedly between 
pairs of these attribute sets.  Statistical techniques are then employed to extract implied valuations. 
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The DMV groups go through three separate sessions with 3-4 day gaps 
between them.  Session 1 is noted as identical to that of Macmillan et al (2002) and 
here specifies use of a moderator.  The objective is to have individual respondents 
make choices from a self-interested perspective.  In Session 2 ideas of good and fair 
ecological and economic states are discussed and the choices are framed as “on 
behalf of the community, defined as present and future generations sharing the 
same local environment”, but with choices still made “by each individual separately 
and confidentially” (Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006: 469).  Session 3 frames 
choices as being collective and made by the group, rather than individual, with a 
decision rule of majority voting on choices subject to “not making any jury member 
unhappy” (Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006: 469).  The stated preference survey is 
as before and therefore Session 3 represents an individual choice setting being 
made by the group. 
The DMV groups are claimed to be representative of the general population 
on the basis of some criteria of which membership of environmental groups, income 
and age are mentioned.  In what way these 24 people are “representative” is 
unclear.  There is a desire on the author’s part for statistical representation which is 
mitigated by the sample size.  However, the authors repeat a paragraph from 
Macmillan et al (2002: 51) which claims that under deliberative approaches 
participants have some “symbolic representative” role (Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 
2006: 466-467).  What this might be is never defined or pursued.  In the conclusions 
they are clearly more concerned about statistical representation as they bemoan the 
small sample size as a “major problem” (Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006: 475). 
In the analysis of the results there are 6 attitude type scales based upon some 
35 items.  Unfortunately there is no explanation of scale constructs or reporting of 
20 
C.L. Spash 
their statistical independence or reliability.  The clearest are three on environmental 
water quality and its consequences, while the most confused try to combine beliefs 
about industry, government and pollution so that what they measure is most unclear.  
Having said this, the attempt is better than most found in stated preference studies 
(eg. membership of environmental groups is often claimed to be an attitude 
measure?).  The general point seems to be that stated preferences can be shown to 
be related to attitudes even when the measures may not be to the standard of those 
in social psychology (from whence the concept as measurable arises, see Spash, 
2006). 
The main result is reported in terms of how the outcomes from different 
framings (sessions and main survey) compare.  The choice model parameters prove 
different across framings except in the case of the requests in Sessions 2 and 3 
which emphasise fairness and community and in the latter case are negotiated group 
values.  The attribute values (part-worth) of the choices are reported in a table 
showing how the money values changed, but interestingly this is discussed in terms 
of ordinal rankings.  One thing to note is that Session 2 could not be reported in this 
way because the cost element proved insignificant; so the choices are not 
dependent upon cost (perhaps equating to charitable giving in CVM).  The remaining 
result shows a dramatic ranking switch where the two individualistic approaches 
(main survey and Session 1) have some similarity while the socially negotiated 
choice (Session 3) proved entirely different.  Most notably the improvement of water 
ecology to the highest level is elevated to the most important priority having been 
fifth in the other framings. 
The authors have little to offer in terms of explanation.  They also are 
somewhat perplexed as to how the results can be employed.  Their implicit price 
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approach via choice modelling focuses upon individual values chosen by the group.  
Thus, there is no aggregate and no clear way in which to reach one given that the 
values being articulated are not standard WTP amounts relating to neoclassical 
welfare theory.  The authors are aware of having changed preferences and values 
(as implicit prices) but seem less aware of preference construction via institutional 
design or the varying value concepts and motives with which they are playing. 
Individual and Group Determination of Social WTP 
A different approach to DMV seeks a social WTP in line with the thrust of the 
theoretical literature.  Social WTP is an already aggregated value which can be 
expressed either by an individual (Gregory and Wellman, 2001) or a group (James 
and Blamey, 2005).  This approach also moves well away from the attempts to 
validate an individual monetary valuation within a standard economic framework. 
Gregory and Wellman (2001) present a carefully designed and conducted 
study on management options for Tillamook Bay, Oregon.  Critical but controversial 
ecosystem management actions are identified via detailed “value-elicitation 
sessions” held with stakeholders prior to small group (8-12 people) stakeholder 
sessions for obtaining social WTP.  The authors chose social WTP for three reasons: 
they regard standard CVM results as producing measures of attitudes not economic 
value; they cite the public good aspect of their case study as likely to lead to 
charitable contributions if a standard WTP question is asked; they believe social 
WTP better reflects opportunity costs ie. the trade-off with other publicly funded 
projects.  The authors note that a variety of metrics are best with some cases being 
suited to monetary expression but, because this tends to reduce the quality of 
information, in other cases environmental values are best reported directly in terms 
of trade-offs across options or in terms of preference ranking.  The monetary value 
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elicitation is achieved by a form of choice experiment giving a stated preference by 
individual participants.  However, the authors emphasise the ability of the small 
group sessions to produce information on distributional consequences, to 
communicate information on complex problems, and that their approach reflects a 
decision and trade-off focus rather than a number focus.  In addition, failure by 
individuals to complete certain valuation tasks is more easily identified as linked to 
controversial aspects of specific options. 
There were 89 participants with 79 surveys completed and five sub-sample 
splits for different management options/issues.  This prevents statistically 
representative sample analysis.  Results are reported in terms of what the majority of 
a group decide is the social WTP within a relatively wide margin and how this is 
subject to change with options.  The authors argue, persuasively, that avoiding over 
precision (as gained from a standard stated preference approaches) is best given 
the available knowledge base and uncertainty.  A key contribution is to identify that a 
majority of stakeholders support specific actions within a given price range.  In 
addition the approach is noted to have achieved its goals of encouraging public 
involvement and community participation.  This is more than an academic research 
exercise as the project clearly linked into an on-going decision process about natural 
resource management in the region, with the study’s conduct and outcomes having 
real consequences. 
James and Blamey (2005) concentrate on a DMV approach, which they 
describe as a citizens’ jury with the added task of determining societal WTP for a 
specified programme involving environmental improvement.  They open by 
addressing problems and issues relating to the theory and application of both the 
CVM and deliberative approaches in order to support the need for a DMV approach.  
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The empirical case study is the management of national parks in New South Wales, 
Australia.  There is a concern that the participants be representative on the basis of 
gender, age, place of residence, ranking of the environment in relation to other social 
issues, occupation, income, income source and education.  There were thirteen 
participants (and one no show). 
The DMV panel was given three options developed by the researchers and a 
fourth developed on the basis of answers given to a “straw preference poll” (although 
what this involved is unclear).  Participants were limited to considering only these 
options.  After individual consideration of three options the panel was convened and 
the choices discussed.  The aim of the researchers was for a consensus report and 
the panel gave a preferred option with qualifications covering the concerns of those 
who were initially against that option.  Next the valuation question was introduced as 
part of the fourth option. 
The task for the panel was to determine how high a park “levy” would have to 
be before the NSW public would be no better off than under the status quo.  That is 
they were being asked to set an aggregate annual income tax for NSW, rather than 
their own maximum WTP as in a CVM survey.  The panel produced two amounts 
and voted to decide which was to be recommended.  The use of majority voting 
occurred at several stages in the discussions in order to close down dissent. 
In their conclusions the authors discuss a question which remains open, that 
is how to interpret the value obtained?  The amount fails to relate to economic 
welfare theory and would seem hard to compare with other microeconomic welfare 
theoretic measures.  At the same time the thirteen panellists cannot claim statistical 
representation of the general population.  If their position is taken as a political 
indicator then other alternatives might prove more direct.  The authors also raise 
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several other issues including consensus formation, decision rules for polling or 
voting, equality of juror impact, and provision of information. 
MORE VALID RESULTS OR NEW VALUE THEORY? 
The review of empirical studies shows the majority have concentrated upon trying to 
achieve a modified exchange value with minimal deliberative engagement.  Table 2 
lists the empirical studies reviewed as they fall under each of the quadrants of DMV 
valuation process and outcome.  A comparison with Table 1 shows the polar 
divergence in attention between theoretical advocates and practitioners.  Theorists 
advocate group arbitrated social values while most studies are producing charitable 
contributions by individuals.  The two social value studies seem closest to repeating 
the thrust of the theoretical DMV literature, but this then questions the validity of 
standard valuation approaches. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Internal Validity 
A strong and repeated claim by studies producing WTP/WTA amounts in the 
charitable contribution category is that DMV has improved the validity of the results.  
However, none defines what type of validity is being addressed.  Validity can be 
classified in various ways: face validity is whether results are intuitively plausible; 
construct validity concerns consistency with theoretical foundations; predictive 
validity is whether the expected outcome was matched by the actual outcome; 
criterion validity relates to corroborating factors which confirm model prediction and 
is important where predictions cannot be confirmed by direct observation; 
convergent validity requires different techniques to give the same results; divergent 
validity requires the same technique to give different results where context predicts 
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that should occur, eg. the CVM measuring WTP for two different population income 
distributions.  Attention should be paid to the full range of validity tests.  In practice 
different aspects of validity seem to be given little attention in the monetary valuation 
and transfer literature (Spash and Vatn, 2006). 
The results reported in the preceding section do not appear encouraging in 
terms of validating standard economic approaches to value theory.  The models 
constructed generally have poor statistical robustness and show an inability of the 
authors to explain their results.  Contrary to standard economic models of exchange, 
factors such as attitudes tend to arise as key variables.  Yet what these attitudes 
represent is poorly defined and their measurement leaves much to be desired.  If 
construct validity is the objective, and researchers are trying to learn from their 
empirical results, there would need to be serious attention paid to the attitude-
behaviour literature in social psychology.  This might indeed be informative but is as 
likely to show the prevalence of non-economic motives for valuation as support the 
exchange value model (Spash, 2006). 
A predictive validity test is most clear in the study by Shapansky,  Adamowicz 
and Boxall (2006).  The results failed to match their expectations and the DMV 
approach produced results similar to the standard stated preference technique but a 
mild version was different.  They were unable to explain this outcome.  Kenyon and 
Hanley (2005) found little change in the “don’t know” responses after deliberation, 
and participants showed dissatisfaction with the outcome of the process.  The 
expectation was the opposite.  More generally there is a problem is terms of what 
might be expected from DMV, eg. should payments be increasing or decreasing, 
should they be more or less stable, should the standard deviation increase or 
decrease.  In this respect the theoretical work of Howarth and Wilson (2006) does 
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actually offer a testable hypothesis.  The approach of DMV practitioners lacks 
theoretical underpinning and rigorous hypothesis testing. 
 
Where the research has been more open to reporting rather than rejecting data, 
there is some evidence for non-economic values arising through open deliberation.  
That is DMV has been cited as increasing the occurrence of lexicographic 
preferences (Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007b: 294).  This is what a reading of the 
political process literature would lead one to expect, but it does not help economists 
produce a more internally valid exchange value and indeed undermines the face 
validity of any aggregated numbers then produced for a CBA.  Similarly face validity 
is reduced by the approaches taken to control data collection and analysis. 
Closing Down Debate and Controlling Value Expression 
If we look at the theory behind DMV there are clearly divergent expectations 
resulting in different approaches to the conduct of the process and treatment of data.  
At one extreme is the desire to control the entire process to achieve a narrowly 
defined value and at the other a desire for opening-up the decision space to allow for 
pluralism and social negotiation.  This affects the whole process from setting-up and 
framing the problem, selecting the respondents, conducting the deliberative process, 
through to analysing data and presenting results. 
O'Neill (2001) differentiates the concerns of political scientists over 
representation from those of other social scientists.  For the former the aim is to 
allow for the expression of legitimate views,6 whereas the aim for the latter is 
                                                 
6
 Developing the meaning of representation in the political context means differentiating between 
those outside an existing group who express solidarity (for example, a man supporting feminism) 
and those who are assumed to be representative of a group (for example, a woman writing on 
27 
Deliberative Monetary Valuation (DMV) in Practice 
 
prediction and explanation.  In both cases the analyst makes a decision over 
participation and the criterion for what makes an individual ‘representative’.  
Representation here diverges from the requirements for legitimacy discussed by 
O'Neill (2001) and is more concerned with loosely representing a range of 
socioeconomic characteristics.  Indeed the participants are drawn from a sub-sample 
who have already self-selected on the basis of their interest in being a participant. 
In DMV we find the likes of Ward (1999) arguing for representation on the 
political basis of the views held in society.  This appears to be picked-up by the likes 
of Macmillan et al (2002: 51) and Alvarez-Farizo & Hanley (2006: 466-467) when 
they claim that under deliberative approaches participants have some “symbolic 
representative” role.  However, these studies spend their time concerned with 
statistical representation using socio-economic variables.  The selection criteria for 
socio-economic characteristics under such representation are never explained and 
even the variables are left unspecified in some cases.  Gregory and Wellman (2001) 
do represent societal views but via vested interests, which is seen as a potentially 
problematic route by theoretical advocates of DMV. 
Monetary valuation surveys aim for random or stratified sampling in order to 
achieve statistical parametric analytical power.  As Stagl (2007: 17) notes “This focus 
on statistical power has been criticised for failing to offer an adequate account of 
either interpretation or explanation in the social sciences.  Interpretative activity is 
already implicitly presupposed in arriving at statistical generalisations between socio-
economic variables.”  CVM practice is then recognised as failing to take this 
                                                                                                                                                        
feminist issues). The latter can gain legitimacy through authorisation by a group and being held 
accountable to them. This is impossible for future generations and nonhuman species. Thus, O'Neill 
(2001) argues that their voice must be expressed by solidarity and making epistemic claims of 
legitimacy. Epistemic claims, which allow someone to speak on behalf of others, include knowledge, 
expertise, and judgment. 
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interpretative dimension seriously.  DMV offers the potential to respond to this 
criticism by collecting small group data that can be used to achieve both the 
interpretative and explanatory depth missing from large-scale statistical studies.  
Unfortunately, the main practitioners of DMV bemoan the lack of statistical power 
rather than developing the skills for conducting interpretative activity. 
Worse than just ignoring the richness of the available data there is evidence 
of forcing reality into a preconceived model, ie. reification.  Several studies see the 
aim as getting people to conform to a market model of valuation and exchange, even 
if the people do not wish to do so.  This is clear in the considerable effort to 
“educate” people  and remove lexicographic preferences (Urama and Hodge, 2006), 
to remove bids based upon fairness (Macmillan et al., 2002), and to simply remove 
whole sections of the sample as protestors (Kenyon and Hanley, 2005).  There is a 
concern for “identification of invalid responses influenced by strategic bidding or 
protesting” (Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007b: 292), and “meaningful values” are 
discussed as requiring “financial incentives, sufficient participant experience and 
elimination of biased preconceived views” (Lienhoop and MacMillan, 2007a). 
The general approach of DMV practitioners can be seen as Aldred’s (2005) 
closed input and closed output case, ie. making the DMV comparable (in those 
terms) to the CVM.  Thus we find Macmillan et al. (2002; 2006) bound choice with a 
payment card; Urama and Hodge (2006) allude to an open process while tightly 
focussing on consequential relationships reinforced by repeated education sessions; 
and in several studies the moderator makes sure people conform to the analysts 
strictly defined discussion boundaries.  Such practices are consistent with the view 
that preferences need to be informed, even though the authors often cite the whole 
DMV approach as aiming to address preference formation.  Even James and Blamey 
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(2005), who use a formal citizens’ jury, restrict their participants to discussing just 
three options.  The likes of Gregory and Wellman (2001), along with all the theory 
articles, argue for a more open and honest admission of the types of values which 
people do associate with environmental change, and the realisation that a request 
for an individual WTP for complex environmental changes is likely to reveal various 
non-economic motives. 
The main position here can be summarised by reference to Hanley and 
Shogren (2005).  They effectively advocated a type of social engineering in order to 
remove non-market motives, irrational behaviour and “anomalies” and to get people 
to conform to their theoretical model.  As they state: “Observed irrationality suggests 
that we either modify our models, or we keep the models by removing the 
anomalous behaviour with arbitrage.” (Hanley and Shogren, 2005: 24).  Economists 
then need to design process so “that people can learn to act rationally” (Hanley and 
Shogren, 2005: 29).  In order to achieve the desired behaviour requires “active 
institutions exist that reward reliable and punish unreliable choices” (Hanley and 
Shogren, 2005: 14).  The aim is then to ‘educate’ people how to behave rationally so 
that environmental CBA can be performed without the unwanted and anomalous 
behaviour.  “By learning the costs of irrationality when an exchange institution exists 
to punish such behaviour, people stop being irrational” (Hanley and Shogren, 2005: 
25).  Such authors appear to fall into the economic valuation camp identified by Vatn 
(2004) as those who regard all anomalies as “measurement bias” to be removed by 
careful design and data censoring. 
The deliberative political model, such as found under a citizens’ jury, involves 
a very different approach.  This is an open process where the jurors can call 
evidence, question alternatives and express their opinions and concerns with the 
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expectation of these being taken seriously and reported back.  In discussing 
discursive ethics for environmental policy and ecosystem valuation O’Hara (1996: 
105) notes that: “…for a discourse process to be ethical it has to be open, respectful, 
and willing to accept and hear diversity of voices.  Otherwise it will be in danger of 
deteriorating into a manipulative assertion of predetermined agendas.” 
In discussing DMV, as a value articulating institution (VAI), Vatn (2005) notes 
the apparent contradiction of using deliberation to foster communicative rationality, 
via evaluating and defending arguments, and then combining this with stated 
preference approaches under a CBA.  As he states: “It mixes collective reasoning 
and consensus building over principles and norms with individual trade-off 
calculations.  It combines a VAI based on capturing incommensurability with one that 
is focused on commensurability.  It mixes a VAI directed towards the ‘We’ with one 
based on an ‘I’ perspective.” (Vatn, 2005: 360-361).  If the aim were to have a DMV 
clearly separated on the basis of such factors then only the social WTP/WTA which 
is achieved via a process of group arbitration and negotiation would appear suitable.  
Interestingly this is the type of DMV argued for by all DMV theorists except Sagoff.  
However, the resulting value no longer appears to be based upon current economic 
theory or models. 
What we seem to be observing under DMV is a debate over realms of value 
along the lines discussed by Trainor (2006).  Different qualities of value are then 
being expressed through different institutional arrangements as represented by the 
quadrants of Tables 1 and 2.  The exact value characteristics of each quadrant are 
unclear but, from the review conducted here, we can identify different aspects being 
included and excluded, or being given stronger and weaker emphasis.  Thus, Table 
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3 presents a speculative list of what some characteristics might be in order to outline 
how these realms of value might be differentiated. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Production of a monetary value does not mean the value is comparable with the 
numbers in a CBA study.  While this is clearly the desire of some, and indeed a 
substitute for CVM is often the aim in DMV, for others the process is meant to 
produce something very different.  An interesting aspect of DMV is how it has 
attracted support from critics of CBA in theoretical articles while being supported by 
mainstream economic practitioners in empirical studies.  The suspicion that they may 
be talking at cross purposes seems to be confirmed once the values arising from 
DMV are classified by means of derivation and value output.  Economists have been 
looking for a process which addresses the failings of their methods without losing the 
desired closing down to a single definitive monetary number.  The theoretical 
advocates have been pointing a way towards a variety of alternative forms of 
expressed and arbitrated social values. 
This divergence is very clear in the approach taken to empirical work when 
compared to theoretical justifications.  The form of selection for involvement in DMV 
as a citizens’ jury type approach would be to recognise variety in social positions on 
an issue, but for economists the aim is a random selection from a general 
population.  In practice selection may be from interest groups, on the basis of 
undefined socio-economic characteristics, semi-random, quota or convenience.  
Representing silent voices is important for theorists, as is the potential recognition of 
incommensurability and issues of rights and justice.  In case studies we find the 
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expression of non-utilitarian concerns such as fairness is seen as problematic, along 
with refusals to trade and lexicographic preferences.  Such things are in need of 
avoidance and removal according to several practitioners.  The process of group 
deliberation, discussion and decision are recognised as central to the whole DMV 
approach advocated by theorists who argue for consensus group outcomes.  
Practitioners tend to favour individual choice models which mix aspects of the 
individual and social and so create mixed messages. 
Economists are then confronted with dogmatically sticking to their old models 
and removing unacceptable behaviour and motives or accepting that there are other 
ways in which environmental values can be conceptualised and articulated, even as 
monetary numbers.  What seems evident is that open deliberation will raise a range 
of issue which CBA practitioners would rather remove from the environmental values 
agenda.  DMV cannot be used to claim validity for values which participants 
themselves protest about, reject or qualify in numerous ways.  Neither should DMV 
be seen as a means of social engineering by which individuals can be ‘educated’ as 
to the rationality of expressing market values over environmental entities.  The 
potential of the approach would seem to lie in the area of socially arbitrated valuation 
using a process of group decision-making which is explicitly designed to address the 
concerns of political scientists with respect to small group conduct.  Unfortunately 
very little empirical DMV work has been directed towards exploring this realm of 
value. 
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Table 1.  Forms of Value Expression in DMV 
   
Terms in which WTP Specified 
  
Value Provider 
 Individual 
(disaggregated value) 
 Social 
(aggregated value) 
 Individual in a 
Group Setting 
 Charitable Contribution 
(Sagoff, 1998) 
Expressed Social WTP / WTA 
(Sagoff, 1998) 
 Group  Fair Price 
(Sagoff, 1998) 
Arbitrated Social WTP / WTA 
(Brown, Peterson and Tonn, 
1995); (Ward, 1999); (Wilson 
and Howarth, 2002); (Howarth 
and Wilson, 2006) 
 
 
Table 2.  Recent DMV Studies Classified 
   
Terms in which WTP Specified 
  
Value Provider 
 Individual 
(disaggregated value) 
 Social 
(aggregated value) 
 Individual in a 
Group Setting 
 Charitable Contribution 
(Macmillan et al., 2002); 
(Kenyon and Hanley, 2005); 
(Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 
2006) Session 1 & 2; (Urama 
and Hodge, 2006); (Shapansky, 
Adamowicz and Boxall, 2006); 
(Lienhoop and MacMillan, 
2007a; Lienhoop and 
MacMillan, 2007b) 
Expressed Social WTP / WTA 
(Gregory and Wellman, 2001) 
 Group  Fair Price 
(Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 
2006) Session 3 
Arbitrated Social WTP / WTA 
(James and Blamey, 2005) 
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Table 3.  Realms of Value Under DMV 
   
Terms in which WTP Specified 
  
Value Provider 
 Individual 
(disaggregated value) 
 Social 
(aggregated value) 
 Individual in a 
Group Setting 
 Charitable Contribution 
Individual beliefs 
Subjective norms 
Selfish Altruism 
Self interest 
Attitudes 
Expressed Social WTP / WTA 
Political pragmatism 
Social norms 
Social Altruism 
Vested interests 
Sympathy 
 Group  Fair Price 
Fair outcome 
Distribution 
Justice 
Equity 
Arbitrated Social WTP / WTA 
Public interest / common good 
Judgment & common sense 
Incommensurability 
Negotiated norms 
Silent voices 
Fair process 
Rights 
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